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Plea Bargaining and Investigation Effort: 
Inquisitorial Criminal Procedure as a Three-Player 
Game 
Abstract: 
We study the impact of plea bargaining on decision errors and operating costs of the 
inquisitorial justice system. Scholars and legal professionals are divided over whether such 
plea deals are compatible with the inquisitorial tradition. In this paper, we stylize 
inquisitorial criminal procedure as a sequential game with two benevolent investigators, 
judge and prosecutor. Both agents are subject to private investigation costs and seek a 
correct decision over a defendant of uncertain guilt. Our analysis shows that the 
introduction of plea deals in courtroom helps to overcome the problem of effort 
coordination between the two investigating agents. All equilibria that involve a conviction 
also adhere to the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’-conviction threshold. Moreover, we 
demonstrate that plea bargaining reduces the frequency of wrongful convictions (type I 
errors) in inquisitorial procedures. 
JEL-Classification:  K14, K41, D82 
 




Criminal procedure needs to be swift to combat crime. Effective deterrence relies on 
the expectation that unlawful behavior is sanctioned in due time, and the rule of law 
requires that accusations against an individual should be dropped immediately when they 
cannot be substantiated with evidence. The plea bargain between the prosecutor and the 
defendant, a legal practice where the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a reduced 
punishment, is often claimed to serve that purpose. Law and economics scholars have 
stressed many favorable implications of these plea deals, such as saved resources by the 
prosecutorial office and shorter trials (see Lewisch 2000). The most remarkable feature of 
plea bargaining, however, is its self-selection property: as guilty and innocent defendants 
have different expectations about their prospects in court, a plea deal could be offered that 
(some of) the guilty defendants accept while all innocent individuals reject it (see, e.g., 
Baker and Mezzetti 2001). About 90 percent of convictions in the United States involve a 
guilty plea by the defendant (see US Department of Justice 2021). 
Although plea bargaining has become more common in legal justice systems around 
the world, it is often regarded as alien to the inquisitorial law tradition.1 In contrast to 
adversarial procedures where mainly the parties are responsible for fact-finding, the 
                                                 
1 Scholars in inquisitorial legal systems argue that any (negotiated) punishment requires the determination of 
guilt by the state, and this determination needs to be justified by the evaluation of the evidence of the case 
(‘nulla poena sine culpa’). Consequently, any guilty plea that saves court resources due to avoided 




inquisitorial trial is primarily run by the judge as the neutral decision-maker. The judge is 
obliged to establish the truth. The case of Germany, a country that was once called “the 
land without plea bargaining” (Langbein 1979) with a strong inquisitorial tradition, is 
particularly illustrative.2 Klaus Tolksdorf, the former president of the German Federal Court 
of Justice, called the increasing use of plea deals as “devastating for the reputation of justice” 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2009). Other scholars claim that ‘informal’ deals will 
promote guilty pleas by defendants without sufficient evidence (see Jahn and Kudlich 2016). 
A recent government review of plea bargaining in Germany did reveal frequent violations 
of the legal requirements due to ‘informal’ deals, a lack of oversight by prosecutors and 
judges, and degraded safeguards for the defendant (see Altenhain et al. 2020). 
In this paper, we study the impact of plea bargaining on decision errors and 
operating costs of the inquisitorial justice system. Distinct from the previous literature, we 
stylize inquisitorial procedures as a sequential game with two benevolent agents, judge and 
prosecutor, who are subject to private effort costs. Plea bargains are initiated by the judge 
in courtroom. Our analysis shows that the introduction of plea deals helps to dissolve the 
problem of effort coordination between the two investigating agents. In contrast to the 
widespread concerns in the legal debate, we also demonstrate that plea bargaining reduces 
the frequency of wrongful convictions (type I errors) in inquisitorial procedures. 
                                                 
2 Many inquisitorial countries, such as France, have introduced plea deals alongside other adversarial elements 
into their procedures. Such deals typically occur before trial to save resources, but these agreements are later 
validated by the judge. In Germany, the legislator attempted not to interfere with the inquisitorial doctrine, 
i.e. plea deals are to be negotiated during trial (§257c StPO), and the agreement does not relieve the judge of 
his obligation to examine the evidence. 
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The paper is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we provide a review over the related 
literature and introduce our model setup in chapter 3. Chapter 4 then provides an analysis 
of the identified sequential equilibria of the game. We discuss our findings and the 
implications for legal policy in Chapter 5, and chapter 6 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Researchers have shown a strong interest in the institution of plea bargaining both due to 
its strong prevalence particularly in the U.S. criminal justice system and its obvious 
resemblance to pre-trial settlements in civil procedure. From the law and economics 
discipline, plea bargaining has often received a rather favorable, “upbeat assessment” 
(Garoupa and Stephen, 2008, p. 326) for it imposes a price on crime and allows prosecutors 
to effectively reduce their caseload (for an overview, see Lewisch 2000). 
 Since the landmark article of Grossman and Katz (1983) and later refinements by 
Reinganum (1988) and Baker and Mezzetti (2001), the plea bargain has been interpreted as 
an efficient screening device for the prosecutor, enabling her to distinguish the guilty from 
the innocent defendants. Plea bargaining may thus save scarce prosecutorial resources. 
Moreover, Reinganum (1988) showed that the large discretion of the prosecutor to extend 
case-specific bargains to defendants is particularly desirable when previous screening by 
the police force is rather poor. Tsur (2016) demonstrated that all plea bargaining equilibria 
in the interaction of a benevolent prosecutor with strategic defendants and juries show the 
same conviction threshold and thus fit the principle of equality before the law. Despite 
these favorable features, many researchers have questioned the underlying model 
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assumptions, such as benevolent preferences of the prosecutor (see, e.g. Bibas 2004, Garoupa 
2012), her ability to interpret new information in an unbiased manner (see, e.g. Burke 2007, 
Christmann 2021) and risk-neutral behavior by the defendants (see Kobayashi and Lott 
1996).  
 Plea bargaining appears to be deeply rooted in adversarial criminal justice systems.3 
According to scholars of comparative criminal law, the strengths of the adversarial system 
are the superior incentives of the litigants to reveal private information to the court (see, 
among others, Tirole and Detrawipont 1999, Froeb and Kobayashi 2001, Spier 2007, pp. 
313). For example, the information asymmetry between the informed defendant and the 
uninformed prosecutor will continuously diminish in the course of the proceedings, but 
litigation expenditures increase. Given this trade-off between accuracy of the deal and cost-
savings, both parties are motivated to find the best timing for the plea bargain (see Garoupa 
and Stephen, 2008). Many researchers argue that incentives for information collection in 
inquisitorial legal systems are rather low: Kim (2013) points out that, in contrast to the 
parties themselves, the effort of the uninformed inquisitorial judge has to be less effective 
in extracting truthful information. This induces more decision errors by the court. The 
incentive problem becomes even more pronounced when one acknowledges that the 
inquisitorial system relies on two benevolent representatives of society, the judge as 
inquisitor and the prosecutor as his aide. Considering judge and prosecutor as economic 
                                                 
3 In addition to its widespread use in the US, two out of three pleas in England and Wales involve a guilty plea 
by the defendant (see UK Ministry of Justice 2019). However, mere guilty pleas may not be identical to real 
plea bargaining between the parties (see comments by Garoupa and Stephen 2008). 
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agents, Christmann and Kirstein (2020) show that coordination problems emerge as each of 
the two agents prefers to freeride on the other one´s effort. Emons and Fluet (2009) find 
that parties are also more tempted to distort the evidence in the inquisitorial setup than in 
an adversarial hearing. 
 Despite these disparities in legal doctrines, plea bargaining has become common in 
many inquisitorial justice systems (for an overview, see Hodgson 2015). Several legal 
scholars resent this development and regard such bargains as not compatible with the 
inquisitorial law tradition, as the criminal case is not at the discretion of the parties and the 
process of revealing the truth is to be governed by the impartial judge (see, among others, 
Wohlers 2010, Landau 2011, Rönnau 2018). In a comparative law setting, Adelstein and 
Miceli (2001) attempt to capture the traditional differences between the two paradigms by 
assuming that efficiency for adversarial systems is interpreted as a strong aversion to 
wrongful convictions while efficiency for the inquisitorial tradition implies a strong desire 
for convicting the guilty defendants. The authors thus conclude that plea bargaining is 
welfare-enhancing only for adversarial systems, as sentence discounts through bargains 
spare the guilty defendants in order to reduce the social costs of wrongful convictions. Some 
insightful country studies exist. Soubise (2018) finds that the introduction of plea bargaining 
in France in 1999 and 2004 lead to a significant increase in bureaucratization of proceedings. 
Although all deals have to be validated by a judge, a de facto close cooperation between 
judges and prosecutors increases the latter´s more dominant role in case disposition with 
little safeguards for the defendants. Although the Italian Code of Penal Procedure 
underwent a major reform to adversarial procedures including plea deals in 1988, Parlato 
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(2012) sees the Italian systems still as a mixture of adversarial and inquisitorial elements. 
Frommann (2009) even regards Italian plea bargaining to be particularly similar to plea deals 
in the German inquisitorial system. The author describes that in Italy, prosecutor and 
defendant have to conclude the plea bargain before the judge who is still obliged to formally 
determine the guilt of the defendant. The judge then reviews the legal requirements of the 
deal. Moreover, the defendant is always entitled to ask the judge directly for a reduced 
sentence without the agreement of the prosecutor. For Frommann (2009), both measures 
should prevent the prosecutor from overcharging or basing a deal offer an arbitrary grounds 
and provides sufficient independence for the judge.  
 In Germany, the practice of plea deals (‘Absprachen’) had developed more 
informally and in very differing ways throughout courtrooms until the German legislator 
enacted the ‘Law on Agreements in Criminal Proceedings’ in 2009. As part of the official 
government review, Altenhain et al. (2020) present a large comprehensive survey and 
review of case records on the current legal practice under the new law. The authors find 
that about 15 percent of all criminal cases (advocates report higher numbers, between 26 
and 33 percent) are concluded by plea deals, and that the average reduction in punishment 
was stated to be about 20 to 25 percent. For the vast majority of examined cases, plea 
bargaining occurred prior to the hearing of evidence. Moreover, plea deals were usually 
proposed by the judge or, with a higher rate of success, by the defendant, but only rarely 
by prosecutors. The survey also revealed some worrisome findings: interviews indicated 
that some guilty pleas were made by defendants after the judge had threatened the 
defendant with the prospect of a much higher punishment if the deal offer was turned down 
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(so-called ‘Sanktionsschere’). Moreover, defendants often waivered their right to appeal as 
part of the bargain. For the authors, it is also notable that the prosecutorial office rarely 
requested an official review of successful plea bargains, which may not be in line with their 
role as “guardians of the rule of law” (Altenhain et al. 2020, p.537).  
 Previous research has shown that the integration of plea bargaining into inquisitorial 
justice systems produces some difficulties. It remains an open question how the 
coordination of efforts by the two investigators in the inquisitorial tradition, prosecutor and 
judge, is affected by plea bargains. It has also been overlooked that, at least for the case of 
Germany, it is usually not the prosecutor who makes the initial deal offer. 
3. THE INQUISITORIAL PROSECUTION MODEL 
This model builds on the two player prosecution game by Christmann and Kirstein (2020) 
in which the authors study free-riding behavior between the judge (J) and the prosecutor 
(P) in the inquisitorial justice system. We introduce a third player to the game, the 
defendant (D), who may plead guilty to avoid a full trial. Thus, we study the impact of plea 
bargaining on the equilibrium strategies of the three players in the inquisitorial prosecution 
game. 
The defendant is one of two types, as he is either guilty of a crime ( g ) or he is 
innocent ( i ). The type of the defendant is specified by nature (N) at the beginning of the 
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game, and let 𝛾 be the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant.4 While the ex-ante 
probability is assumed common knowledge, only the defendant knows his true type. In this 
game, the defendant is accused of having committed a crime which is subject to the 
punishment 𝐹. Think of the value 𝐹 as society´s response to the alleged unlawful behavior, 
and assume 𝐹 increases with the severity of  the crime. Thus, if the defendant is eventually 
convicted and sentenced, he receives the utility −𝐹, otherwise his utility is set to zero. To 
avoid this punishment, the defendant may give in to a plea deal Σ at an earlier stage, and 
thus accept the bargained sentence without further court procedures. Following this logic, 
we believe that a plea deal may offer some “discount” (Lewisch 2000, p. 250) on the sentence 
to the defendant but it can never exceed the punishment 𝐹 defined by law.5 Nevertheless, 
the deal offer has to exceed mere litigation costs, otherwise proving one´s innocence in 
court would never be rational. Thus, we specify for the deal offer  𝑇 < Σ ≤ F. 
 Society wants the guilty defendants to be convicted and punished while the innocent 
defendants should be acquitted and set free. Wrongful convictions (type I error) and 
wrongful acquittals (type II error) thus deviate from the goals of society, and should be 
avoided. We assume that the prosecutor and the judge adhere to these goals. If a truly guilty 
defendant is wrongfully acquitted, then each agent receives a disutility of 𝐻. If a truly 
innocent individual is sent to prison, then prosecutor and judge receive the disutility 𝛼𝐻, 
                                                 
4 The ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant can be interpreted as the level of initial suspicion that a 
particular person committed the offence. It is determined by the capability of the police force to correctly 
identify and apprehend suspects. 
5 The study by Altenhain et al. (2020, p. 525) reports that plea bargains in Germany show an average discount 
of about 25 percent to the full trial outcome.  
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with 𝛼 > 1. Image the value 𝛼 to be the number of wrongful acquittals of guilty defendants 
that are acceptable for society  in order to avoid the wrongful conviction of a single innocent 
individual (see Tsur 2017, p. 198). We thus follow the general notion that wrongful 
convictions are regarded as more harmful by liberal societies. Consider the probability 𝜇 to 
be the belief of the judge upon trial that the defendant is actually guilty, then the judge will 
convict the defendant if −(1 − 𝜇)𝛼𝐻 ≥ −𝜇𝐻 applies. This gives the court´s decision 
standard (‘beyond reasonable doubt’)6 for a conviction as 𝜇 ≥ 𝛼1+𝛼. 
 The prosecutor and the judge seek to determine the true type of the defendant. For 
this, each of the two players may investigate the evidence of the case. For simplicity, we 
assume that investigations perfectly reveal the defendant´s true type, but produce effort 
costs Pc  for the prosecutor and Jc  for the judge. Given that the prosecutorial office has 
superior resources and closely cooperates with the police forces at all times, we assume that 
the prosecutor can investigate the case at lower costs compared to the judge (i.e., P Jc c  
holds). This captures the widely held perception of the prosecutorial office as the chief 
investigator (so-called ‘Herrin des Ermittlungsverfahrens’)7 in inquisitorial criminal 
systems. If the case actually moves to court, then all players bear additional trial costs 𝑇. 
                                                 
6 While the expression ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is rooted in the adversarial doctrine, the presented rationale 
carries over to the inquisitorial tradition. Moreover, the German Federal Court of Justice repeatedly specified 
for criminal procedure that a conviction of the defendant requires the judicial evaluation of the evidence to 
achieve a sufficient level of certainty which, in the wording of the court, precludes reasonable doubts (see 
BGH 01.07.2008, 1 StR 654/07). 
7 In German criminal procedure, the prosecutorial office clearly dominates the investigations prior to the 
charge, monitors the police force and even supervises the adherence to the law during trial. Its famous 
nickname is also used by the Federal Court of Justice (see, e.g., BGH II BGs 335/99 [2009]). 
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However, whether the case was already investigated by the prosecutor or simply passed on 
to court without examination remains the private information of the prosecutor.8 
Furthermore, we assume that the prosecutor bears a reputational loss 𝐿 when she loses a 
case that she chose to bring to court.9 All players are assumed to be risk-neutral, and they 
maximize their expected utility. 
 The non-cooperative game consists of four stages, as illustrated by Figure 1: The 
investigations of the prosecutor (stage 1) and her decision to charge the defendant (stage 2), 
the potential plea deal (stage 3), and the judge who makes the final decision (stage 4). 
First, nature determines whether the defendant is truly guilty or innocent. At 
stage 1, the prosecutor may either decide to investigate the evidence of the case, which 
means that she learns the defendant´s true type, or she may proceed without further 
investigations. Then she can drop charges and end the game, or she decides to take the case 
to court at stage 2. Prior to court proceedings, the judge offers a plea deal to the defendant 
at stage 3, which can either be accepted and the game ends, or the deal is rejected by the 
defendant and court proceedings commence. At stage 4, the judge observes the charge and 
the failure of plea bargaining. He may then either investigate the case himself, which leads 
                                                 
8 While an agent will never declare that she has not examined the evidence of the case, it will be difficult to 
assess her true investigative effort only from the written report in the case file (the ‘dossier’) that is passed on 
to the judge. 
9 Note that the inquisitorial principle of compulsory prosecution for capital offences only requires the 
prosecutor to move to court if she regards the evidence to be sufficient to support the charge. In the world of 
our model, this still implies that she can decide to drop the case if the probability of guilt is rather low. 
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to a correct court decision, or decide about conviction or acquittal based on his beliefs about 
the defendant´s guilt.  
 




4. EQUILIBRIA ANALYSIS  
4.1.  Equilibria in pure strategies 
In the following, we study the strategic interaction between the two enforcement agents, 
judge and prosecutor, and the defendant in inquisitorial criminal procedure when plea 
bargaining is possible. We develop the strategic form of the game to identify all Nash 
Equilibria (NE), and then apply the narrower concept of Sequential Equilibrium (SE) to 
verify whether these equilibria are also plausible given the timing of the game.10 For the 
sake of brevity, we use the following notation for the described actions: investigate case 
(inv), not investigate case (n), charge defendant (ch), drop case (dr), convict defendant (co), 
acquit defendant (ac), reject deal (rej) and accept deal (acc). 
A Sequential Equilibrium (SE) in this game of asymmetric information consists of 
the strategy profile  * , ,P J Ds s s  , with 𝑠𝑃 ∈ [(𝑖𝑛𝑣); (𝑛, 𝑐ℎ); (𝑛, 𝑑𝑟)], 𝑠𝐽 ∈[(Σ, 𝑖𝑛𝑣); (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑐𝑜); (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑎𝑐)] and 𝑠𝐷 ∈ [(𝑟𝑒𝑗, 𝑟𝑒𝑗); (𝑟𝑒𝑗, 𝑎𝑐𝑐); (𝑎𝑐𝑐, 𝑟𝑒𝑗); (𝑎𝑐𝑐, 𝑎𝑐𝑐)], and 
the judicial beliefs  1 |g ch  and  2 |g ch rej  , when the assessment  1 2*, *, *    is 
sequentially rational and consistent for every information set. This implies that each 
“player´s own strategy is optimal starting from every point in the [game] tree” (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982, p. 863). 
The plea bargaining literature particularly focuses on the self-selection properties of 
the equilibria. In this game, three pooling equilibria in pure strategies exist where both 
                                                 
10 In Annex A1, we explain the elimination of dominated strategies. See Annex A2 for the strategic form. 
14 
 
types of defendants apply the same strategy. By the virtue of the SE, these outcomes hold 
even when the players´ beliefs consider mistakes by the other players that occur with a 
small probability.11 
For low values of the prior  , there exists one SE in pure strategies where the 
prosecutor drops the case without further investigations. For this equilibrium to hold, the 
probability of a guilty defendant must be so low that investigating the case is not favorable 







), any filed case would then only lead to an acquittal. 
Proposition 1. The strategies  ( , );( 0, , );( , )n dr n ac rej rej   are (i) a NE which 









   and beliefs 1   and 2   apply.  
Proof.  See Appendix A3. 
For intermediate probabilities of guilt, one SE in pure strategies exists where the 
Prosecutor investigates the case and charges the guilty defendants, all defendants accept the 
plea deal and the judge would convict the defendant if trial occurred. This equilibrium 
builds on the insight that the judge can rely on a high probability of guilty defendants if the 
case actually reaches court. Clearly, the investigating prosecutor would only charge the 
guilty defendants. But even if the prosecutor (or the defendant) ‘trembles’ and deviates from 
                                                 
11 For the three pooling equilibria, the equilibrium path does not reach all information sets. The widespread 
concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, however, imposes little restrictions on rational beliefs about zero-
probability events (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1999, pp. 321). We apply the more refined concept of Sequential 
Equilibria here to identify credible outcomes. 
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the optimal strategy with small probability, it is simply less likely that two errors occur 
simultaneously, i.e. an innocent defendant is actually charged and also rejects the deal by 
mistake. Thus, the judge can almost with certainty believe in the guilt of the defendant if a 
case does actually reach court. Consequently, he decides for the conviction. In other words, 
the posterior belief of the judge satisfies the ‘reasonable doubt’-decision standard due to the 






). Even though this is technically a pooling 
equilibrium, note that it implies that all guilty defendants plead guilty and no innocent 
individual is charged. We will explain in the discussion chapter that this SE is particularly 
remarkable and implies an increase in efficiency through plea bargaining.  






  , P
c
H
   and beliefs 1 1   and 2 1   apply. 
Proof. See Appendix A4. 
Note that an equilibrium where the judge always investigates the case and the 
prosecutor charges blindly cannot exist here: innocent defendants would almost never 
accept plea deals if they can expect the judge to examine the case.12 If the innocent 
defendants rejected the deal, however, the judge would prefer to acquit the defendant. This 
would make the guilty defendant reject the deal as well, and then again require 
                                                 
12 Except trivial deals between zero and the costs of trial. Then, of course, there is no reason why the judge 
should choose (inv). 
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investigations by the judge. Plainly, a SE in pure strategies where the judge always 
investigates the case cannot exist. 
For high values of the probability of a guilty defendant  , one SE in pure strategies 
exists where the prosecutor charges, both enforcement agents do not investigate the case 
and all defendants accept the plea bargain. This equilibrium is obtained when the rational 
prosecutor prefers a ‘blind’ charge to further investigations and the probability of guilt 
exceeds the conviction threshold. This combination of strategies is only credible, however, 
when the high probability of guilt would convince the judge to convict any defendant 
without examining the evidence, otherwise the innocent defendant would never have 
accepted the plea bargain in the first place. 
Proposition 3. (i) The strategies  ( , );( , , ); ( , )n ch F n co acc acc   constitute a SE if 
















   and beliefs 1   and 2   apply. 
Proof. See Appendix A5. 
4.2.  Mixed strategies 
In addition to the three pooling equilibria in pure strategies, one equilibria in mixed 
strategies should be discussed in more detail. There exists a semi-separating equilibria where 
all three players randomize: some guilty defendants accept the plea deal while the 
remaining guilty and all innocent defendants reject it, the judge investigates the case with 




Proposition 4. P plays ( )inv  with probability 
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 
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This mixed-strategy equilibrium is instructive to understand the strategic interaction 
between the three players. For this equilibrium to exist, the two following conditions have 









the prosecutor will charge blindly if the judge examines the case with certainty in court. 
The more often the judge decides to convict the defendant blindly and reduce his effort in 
investigations, thus J  gets lower, the more the upper boundary for the prosecutor´s mixed 









, and this strict preference for blind charges declines. Note 
that besides Proposition 2, no further pooling equilibrium (that is, all defendants either 
accept or reject the plea offer) can exist in any mixed-strategy combination by the other 
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players.13 Trivially, also no separating equilibrium can exist where the defendant always 
reveals his true type.14  
Concerning the defendant, his bargaining behavior is fully dependent on his 
expectation about the outcome of trial. Thus, only the judge is in a position to make the 
(guilty) defendant indifferent between accepting or rejecting the plea bargain. Clearly, it is 
in the interest of the judge that innocent defendants do never accept the deal offer. Given 
his three pure strategies (Σ, 𝑖𝑛𝑣), (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑐𝑜) and (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑎𝑐), the mixing judge has two options.15 
Randomizing between investigations and a ‘blind’ conviction can never make the guilty 
defendant indifferent as we assumed that the deal offer   cannot exceed the punishment 
imposed by law ( F  ) and trial costs are positive. Thus, the mixing judge has to randomize 
between the strategies (Σ, 𝑖𝑛𝑣) and (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑎𝑐). Offering a deal   with J F T    would 
then turn the guilty defendant indifferent between accepting or rejecting the deal, if the 
judge investigates the case with probability J  but otherwise acquits the defendant. Clearly, 
no innocent defendant would accept such a deal as he can expect to be acquitted either way. 





  , and * (0;1)J   for 
                                                 
13 If the defendant played (rej, rej), the judge would optimally respond with (inv). However, it always 
preferable for him to lower Σ at the earlier stage to make some guilty defendants accept the offer and save 
trial costs. This cannot be a pooling solution. If the defendant plays (acc,acc), the prosecutor would always 
play (inv) and the judge (n,co) which is the SE in pure strategies of Proposition 2. 
14 If the defendant played (acc, rej), the judge would optimally respond with (n, acq) with contradicts the 
behavior of the guilty defendant. If the defendant played (rej, acc), the judge would optimally respond with 
(n, co) with contradicts the behavior of the guilty defendant. Note that Σ=0 is not preferable for the judge. 
15 Note that a third option, mixing between a blind conviction and a blind charge, is never in the interest of 
the judge as long as the alternative (inv) exists. 
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T   and T F   . Evidently, a higher deal offer requires a higher probability of judicial 
investigations into the case, * 0
J
   . As a consequence, a rational judge may thus reduce 
his own costly effort on the equilibrium path by lowering the plea offer  before trial.  
Now consider the judge. Both the guilty defendant and the prosecutor can affect his 
choice between investigations and ‘blind’ acquittal. Interestingly enough, both players 
affect the belief of the judge about the probability of a guilty defendant in opposing ways. 
On the one hand, the more plea deals are accepted by guilty defendants, the lower their 
share in the cases that are tried in court. On the other hand, the more cases are investigated 
by the prosecutor, the more charges against the innocent are dropped and the share of guilty 
defendants in court increases. As we established above that J F T    must hold for the 
guilty defendant in equilibrium, the judge can only be made indifferent between his 
strategies (Σ, 𝑖𝑛𝑣) and (Σ, 𝑛, 𝑎𝑐). For the judicial belief 2  about the defendant´s guilt in 




  .16 Let P  be the probability that the prosecutor herself examines 
the evidence, and assume G   describes the probability that the guilty defendant rejects the 
deal offer. Observing the charge and the rejection of the deal offer by the defendant, the 





   

  
. Consequently, the judge is made 







   

  
 holds. Solved for the mixing 
                                                 
16 Note that this posterior belief does not contradict the ‘reasonable doubt’-decision standard as the judge 

















, with * (0;1)G   for 1P   and
J
c H  .17 Not surprisingly, this gives * 0
G P
    . The guilty defendant has to accept 
more plea deals when the prosecutor is more likely to investigate the evidence and thereby 
improve the selection of cases for trial. 
Concerning the prosecutor, the guilty defendant and the judge can make her 
indifferent between investigations and charging without examining the evidence. If the 
prosecutor investigates the evidence to the case, she incurs effort costs Pc , and moves to 
costly trial only when the guilty defendants reject the plea deal. Then, if the judge decides 
to acquit the defendant, this creates a type II error with costs H. However, if she decides 
against investigations and charges all defendants, four outcomes are possible depending on 
whether the guilty defendant rejects the deal and whether the judge investigates the case 
himself. These considerations give the following condition to hold in order to make the 
prosecutor indifferent between her two strategies: 
     
   
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )( )
P G J G J G J
G J G J
c T H T L T H L
T L T L
        
     
            
          
 
Again solved for G , this gives  



























and (0;1)J  . In order for the guilty defendant to play a mixed strategy, the prosecutor 
must prefer a blind charge to investigation whenever the judge would investigate the case. 
                                                 
17 Note that this condition also implies that there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies if the prosecutor always 
investigates the case. 
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Moreover, the probability of judicial investigations is positive, but lower than one. This is 
straightforward: if the judge always investigated, the prosecutor would just prefer the blind 
charge. We find * 0
G J
    . That is, in order to make the prosecutor indifferent, more 
deals are rejected by the guilty defendants when the judge is more likely to look into the 
case. In other words, the guilty defendant has to reject more deals and thereby keep the risk 
of trial to the prosecutor steady when an increase in judicial investigations otherwise results 
in less wrongful acquittals of guilty defendants in court.  
Equating both expressions for G , we determine the optimal mixing strategy for the 
prosecutor with 










   
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 
. As best responses, the judge 
randomizes optimally between investigations and acquittal with *J
T
F
  , the guilty 












, and the innocent 
defendant rejects all deal offer. This concludes the proof to Proposition 4. 
As the judge has the discretionary power over the offered plea deal   in the game, 
he will make lower offers in order to save own effort costs. In this mixed strategy 
equilibrium, this behavior shows a favorable implication. Less investigations by the judge 
make more guilty defendants accept the deal ( * 0
G J
    ) and this induces more 
investigations by the prosecutor ( * 0
G P
    ). As we initially assumed that the 
prosecutorial office has a cost advantage over the judge in running investigations, this shift 
of effort may be a favorable implication, but at the cost of lower sentences. Thus, a negative 
22 
 
impact of plea deals on the deterrence of crime can be concluded at least for the mixed 
strategy equilibrium.18 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Plea Bargaining eliminates freeriding of the prosecutor 
In contrast to adversarial criminal procedure where the judge has a rather passive role, the 
inquisitorial regime relies on two investigators, judge and prosecutor. Christmann and 
Kirstein (2020) demonstrated that this setting gives rise to a coordination problem: although 
both agents are motived to convict only the guilty defendants, each player prefers that the 
other one bears the effort of investigations. This dilemma resembles the well-known battle-
of-the-sexes game where two equilibria coexist, and each agent is the investigator in one of 
them and the other one freerides. Assuming that the prosecutorial office has a cost 
advantage over the judge due to its better resources and closer contact to the police force, 
efficiency would require the prosecutor to be the investigator. 
 Our analysis shows that allowing for plea bargaining between judge and defendant 
in the inquisitorial setting eliminates this freeriding dilemma in pure strategies. Simply put, 
the rational prosecutor can no longer hope that the judge does all the work. Given plea 
bargaining, an outcome where the prosecutor charges blindly and the judge always 
                                                 
18 In the literature, greater deterrence is caused by either a higher probability of conviction of criminals or 
higher expected punishments (see, e.g., Miceli 1996). A negative impact on deterrence is thus straightforward 
when the bargained sentences are lower. Moreover, lower deterrence could be interpreted as a higher 
prevalence of crime in our model, i.e. the prior γ increases. For the discussed mixed strategy equilibrium, this 
would lead c.p. to higher rates of accepted deals by the guilty defendants, but a steady conviction rate in court. 
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investigates the case is no longer sequentially rational: if the judge examines the evidence, 
only the guilty defendants would accept the deal while all the innocent move to trial. If 
only the innocent proceed to trial, however, no investigation is needed. This dilemma 
makes the threat of investigations by the judge no longer credible.19 It is due to this 
credibility problem that the only surviving SE here is the one where the prosecutor runs 
the investigation (see Proposition 2). In other words, the introduction of plea bargaining 
solves the above discussed coordination problem between the two agents. Under the 
assumption of lower prosecutorial costs, this shift of effort to the prosecutor is also 
increasing efficiency. Furthermore, a negative effect on the deterrence of crime is not to be 
expected, given that the equilibrium deal equals the punishment specified by law. This 
remarkable result is further strengthened by the resistance of the equilibrium to small 
decision errors of the players. Applying the more restrictive concept of Selten´s perfectness 
(see Kreps and Wilson, 1982), we find that the equilibrium strategies will also be chosen if 
each player considers small probability decision errors (‘trembles’) of the others in the 
course of the game and if updated beliefs reflect such trembles. The only (minor) restriction 
is that the ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant must be more than just marginally above 
the lower threshold for the prosecutor, P
c
H
 , so that the prosecutor is not very close to 
being indifferent between investigations or just dropping the case. 
                                                 
19 This clearly resembles the major finding of Baker and Mezzetti (2001) for an adversarial setting. 
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Proposition 2.2. For a given plea deal F   in the reduced 3x3x4 game, the 
strategies  ( );( , ); ( , )inv n co acc acc  and beliefs 1 1   and 2 1   constitute a 





   and P
c
H
  hold. 
Proof. See Appendix A6. 
Furthermore, all equilibria that involve convictions adhere to the decision standard 
of ‘reasonable doubt’. We thus extend the finding of Tsur (2017) to inquisitorial criminal 
procedure. It is also noteworthy to point out that this positive effect is not driven by the 
well-known self-selection mechanism of plea bargaining, given that the equilibrium is a 
pooling one.   
 From the perspective of society, the introduction of plea bargaining to inquisitorial 
criminal procedure thus shows some positive effects. Figure 2 provides an overview over 














(n,dr),(Σ,n,ac),(rej,rej) H  
(type II error) 
0 No No No 
(inv),(Σ,n,co),(acc,acc) 0 Pc  No Yes Yes 
(n,ch),(Σ,n,co),(acc,acc) (1 ) H   
(type I error) 
0 No Yes Yes 
Figure 2. Error and Operating Costs in Pure Strategy Equilibria. 
 Trivially, cases with a low ex-ante probability of guilt are never taken to court and 
therefore plea bargaining does have no impact on efficiency. For intermediate values of the 
prior, operating costs are lower because cases are solved by plea bargaining and not in court. 
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In addition, prosecutorial investigations ensure that only the guilty defendants are subject 
to the (negotiated) sentence. If the probability of guilt is high, again decision errors may 
occur as both agents choose not to look into the evidence. As plea bargains nevertheless 
save trial costs at the same level of errors, this is still (slightly) preferable to procedures 
without plea deals. Note that such low error and operating costs only hold for equilibria in 
pure strategies. 
5.2 No wrongful convictions in the mixed strategy outcome 
 In addition to the SE in pure strategies, the equilibrium in mixed strategies shows 
some different, and less favorable, implications. Most importantly, criminal cases may not 
be investigated at all with positive probability. Furthermore, costly trials occur, and some 
guilty defendants will be wrongfully acquitted by the judge (type II error). It should be 
noted, however, that wrongful convictions (type I error) are fully avoided even in the mixed 
strategy equilibrium. All innocent defendants reject the deal, and even in court they are 
never convicted.20  
 The absence of type I errors even in the mixed strategy equilibrium stands out in 
comparison to inquisitorial procedures without plea bargaining (see Christmann and 
Kirstein 2020). Here the prosecutor randomizes between investigations and blind charges 
to make the judge indifferent, which strictly increases the posterior belief of the judge about 
the probability of facing a guilty defendant in court. In the end, the judge becomes 
                                                 
20 Be reminded that the judge randomizes between ‘acquittal’ and ‘investigate’, and investigations reveal the 
true type of the defendant with certainty. 
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indifferent between investigating the case or convicting the defendant right away, and the 
latter strategy produces some wrongful convictions. This is different when plea bargaining 
is introduced. As a countervailing force to the randomizing prosecutor, some guilty 
defendants may accept the deal and thus decrease the posterior belief of the judge. 
Moreover, the guilty defendant can never be made indifferent about accepting or rejecting 
the deal when the judge randomizes between blind conviction or investigation. In either 
case, the guilty defendant would get sentenced, and prefers any deal ( F  ) to save at least 
the costs of trial. In the plea bargaining setup, the equilibrium posterior belief about the 
defendant´s guilt is thus lower and the judge is turned indifferent between investigations 
and a blind acquittal. From this it follows that under the standard assumptions in the 
literature, such as risk-neutrality and equal beliefs about court outcome (see Kobayashi and 
Lott 1996, Shavell 1982), the innocent defendant will not be convicted either way. As the 
guilty defendants are sentenced only after judicial investigations, this again satisfies the 
‘reasonable doubt’-decision standard. 
 One may argue that the result of zero type I errors is based on the assumption that 
judicial investigations verify the defendant´s true type with certainty. However, type I 
errors did occur under this strong assumption in the setup without plea bargaining (see 
Christmann and Kirstein 2020), so our analysis still reveals a systematic change in the 
production of wrongful convictions once plea bargaining is introduced. In this regard, one 
may say that the allegedly strong aversion of adversarial legal systems to type I errors (see 
Adelstein and Miceli 2001) is transferred into inquisitorial procedure. The elimination of 
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wrongful convictions comes at a cost, namely the creation of wrongful acquittals. In the 
game without plea bargaining, type II errors did not occur in mixed strategies. 
5.3 Deal offers upfront increase decision-errors  
 In most (adversarial) models of plea bargaining, it is the prosecutor who makes the 
deal offer at the beginning of the game. In the previous analysis, we applied a setup with 
deals occurring at trial for two reasons: first, many scholars from the inquisitorial tradition 
reject the idea that deals are made outside courts as this leaves the prosecution of criminals 
to the discretion of the parties (see, e.g., Landau, 2011, p. 540). Second, Altenhain et al. 
(2020) report at least for German inquisitorial criminal procedures that deal offers are rarely 
made by prosecutors. 
Generally, our findings are more sensitive to the timing of the deal offer than to 
which agent proposes the deal offer. Judge and prosecutor largely share the same 
preferences in our setup, and full trial procedures are not launched for the three SEs in pure 
strategies.21 Thus, it has no effect on outcome if we assumed the prosecutor to make the 
take-it-or-leave-it deal offer at decision node J1. If we, however, assumed that the plea offer 
is made by the prosecutor at the beginning of the game, so before node P1, then part of the 
outcome changes. Proposition 1 stills holds, as the defendants anticipate that, upon a 
rejected deal, the prosecutor would drop the case due to its unlikely merit. Moreover, 
Proposition 3 is also valid as the high ex-ante probability of a guilty defendant makes it 
                                                 
21 The only difference in preferences between the two agents is the prosecutor´s aversion to losing in court. 
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sequentially rational to conclude the case with a ‘blind’ conviction. Then, all defendants 
accept the deal. Surprisingly, Proposition 2 no longer holds. 
Corollary 1. If the prosecutor offers the plea deal before decision node P1 (and instead 
of J1), then a pooling equilibrium where both types of defendants accept a deal with 




   . 
To see this, note that a pooling solution where all defendants accept the deal, i.e. 
(acc,acc) is played, would require that no investigations occur and that the judge chooses 
blind convictions on the equilibrium path. If at least one agent can be expected to 
investigate the evidence upon a rejected deal, then the innocent defendants would deviate 





    were 
rejected, the prosecutor (or the judge) will prefer to investigate the case. This effectively 
rules out Proposition 2. Be reminded that, in the original setting, only the guilty defendants 
were brought to court for the plea bargain as prosecutorial investigations had occurred 
beforehand. Also, if both types of defendants rejected the deal and one enforcement agent 
shows no effort, investigating the case would always be a best response for the other agent. 
Thus, the equilibrium cannot be pooling. More precisely, neither a pooling nor a separating 
equilibrium22 can exist in the amended setting for the aforementioned values of the ex-ante 
probability.  
                                                 
22 In line with the literature, it is not surprising that perfect separation cannot be obtained, as this would 
eliminate the need for judge and prosecutor to investigate the case. 
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We conclude that shifting the plea bargaining phase to the beginning of this 
inquisitorial setup shows a negative impact for intermediate values of the prior. More 
precisely, it rules out the one SE where investigations are certan and the evidence is always 
examined at lowest costs.23 What remains then is the well-known semiseparating 
equilibrium in mixed strategies (see Baker and Mezzetti 2001), and its higher error and 
operating costs. Given our inquisitorial setting with two benevolent enforcers, allowing 
plea bargaining in courtroom and after the prosecutor´s decision to charge helps to 
overcome the established commitment problem of the prosecutor, and induces more 
prosecutorial effort into the case. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Applying a sequential prosecution game with two benevolent investigators, the prosecutor 
and the judge, and a defendant of unknown guilt, we find the following general pattern. 
For a low ex-ante probability of guilt, the case is dropped by the prosecutor. For 
intermediate values of the prior, the prosecutor will always investigate the case, she charges 
only the guilty individuals and plea deals are accepted. If the ex-ante probability of a guilty 
defendant is high, the defendant faces a conviction without further investigations and will 
always accept a plea deal. All equilibria that involve a conviction adhere to the ‘reasonable 
                                                 
23 In this intermediate interval of the prior, neither a pooling equilibrium nor a separating equilibrium can 
exist: if one enforcement agent examines the case, the defendants separate. If the defendants separate, then 
the enforcement agents exert no effort. 
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doubt’-decision standard. Comparing these findings to procedures without plea bargaining, 
some more remarks are in order. 
First, the prosecutor can no longer hope to freeride on the certain investigative effort 
of the judge for intermediate ex-ante probabilities of a guilty defendant. Given no 
investigations by the prosecutor, the strategy by the judge to examine the case himself is no 
longer a best response when plea deals are allowed: if the judge investigated the case, only 
the innocent defendants would reject a deal, and then investigations would be pointless. As 
a consequence, the prosecutor will exert effort in the first place and thus only select the 
guilty defendants for trial. If we assume that effort costs are lower for the prosecutorial 
office, this is an efficient outcome. As the judge firmly believes in the guilt of these 
defendants, the offered plea deals do not require a sentencing discount which might degrade 
deterrence. Moreover, this sequential equilibrium is robust even to small decision errors 
(‘trembles’) by the other players. 
Second, offering a plea bargain to the defendant at trial, i.e. after the case was taken 
to court by the prosecutor, avoids the traditional commitment problem in the literature. If 
the deal offer was extended (and potentially accepted) by the defendant before the case is 
brought to court, all equilibria could only be semiseparating in nature. This follows the 
rationale that any perfect separation would prevent the prosecutor from taking the 
remaining cases to court in such a setup, and then guilty individuals will try to mimic the 
innocent ones by rejecting the deal. The established practice of some countries in 
continental Europe, like Germany and Italy, to allow deals only in courtroom and after the 
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prosecutor´s decision is sunk thus avoids this commitment problem and the associated error 
and operating costs. 
Third, the introduction of plea bargaining leads to a significant reduction in 
wrongful convictions (type I errors). To see this, we focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium 
for the intermediate values of the prior. Even when all players randomize between their 
strategies, only wrongful acquittals (type II errors) can occur in equilibrium. As some deals 
are now accepted by the guilty defendants, the judge will then be turned indifferent 
between investigating the case or acquitting the defendant. Neither strategy involves a type 
I court error. In this regard one can say that plea bargaining transfers the preference of 
adversarial systems to avoid wrongful convictions to inquisitorial procedures. This comes 
at the costs of more wrongful acquittals. This mixed strategy equilibrium also shows that 
judges who offer larger sentencing discounts to defendants thereby effectively shift the 
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A1 Elimination of redundancies and dominated strategies 
The strategic form of the prosecution game is specified by the three players, the set of 
strategy combinations, and the set of payoffs that the players attach to each strategy 
combination. This gives a 16x3x4 tri-matrix at first, but this can be further simplified:  
First we discuss the strategies of P which contain “not” to investigate as their first entry:   
•       If P decides, after having not examined the case at P1, to drop the case (at P3), then the 
expected payoffs of both parties amount to –γH each, regardless of what P plans to do at her 
other two decision nodes, and also regardless of J’s plan or D´s reaction. Hence, these four 
strategies of the type (not, x, drop, y), where x and y are either drop or charge, can be 
summarized without loss of information to one strategy pattern which we label “not, drop 
(n, dr).”  
•       A similar line of argument covers the four strategies in which P plans to hand over the 
case to J without having it examined initially, i.e., when P chooses not to investigate at P1, 
and charge at P3. Regardless of what P plans for her other information sets, four rows in 
each if the four 16x3 matrices show identical entries. Hence, we combine these four 
strategies of P without loss of information into one, labeled “not, charge, (n, ch).” 
Finally, we discuss the eight strategies of P that stipulate an investigation at P1. After P has 
investigated the case, the parties’ payoffs do not depend anymore on what P would have 
planned to choose at her information set P3 (the one that is reached after not investigating 
the case). Hence, P has only four relevant types of strategies, depending on the decisions 
made at P2 and P4. The payoffs of those four types of investigation strategies depend on the 
decision of the judge, and are displayed in the tables below for the given strategy of D. The 
letter x represents the possible decisions at P3. To show which investigative strategies are 
dominated, we added the non-investigative strategy type (n, dr) where P does not 




D plays (rej, rej) J investigates J convicts J acquits 
(inv, ch, x, ch) -cP-T-(1-γ)L -cP-T-(1-γ)αH -cP-T-L-γH 
(inv, ch, x, dr) 
= “(inv)” 
-cP-γT -cP-γT -cP-γT-γL-γH 
(inv, dr, x, ch) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(L+T) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(αH+T) -cP-γH-(1-γ)(L+T) 
(inv, dr, x, dr) -cP-γH -cP-γH -cP-γH 
“(n, dr)” (-γH) (-γH) -γH 
 
D plays (acc, acc) J investigates J convicts J acquits 
(inv, ch, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 
(inv, ch, x, dr) 
= “(inv)” 
−𝑐𝑃 
(inv, dr, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 
(inv, dr, x, dr) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 
 
D plays (acc, rej) J investigates J convicts J acquits 
(inv, ch, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝑇 + 𝐿) −𝑐𝑃 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝑇 + 𝛼𝐻) −𝑐𝑃 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝑇 + 𝐿) 
(inv, ch, x, dr) 
= “(inv)” 
−𝑐𝑃 
(inv, dr, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝐿 + 𝑇) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝛼𝐻+T) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)(𝑇 + 𝐿) 
(inv, dr, x, dr) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 
 
D plays (rej, acc) J investigates J convicts J acquits 
(inv, ch, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝑇 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝑇 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾(𝑇 + 𝐻 + 𝐿)          
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               −(1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 
(inv, ch, x, dr) 
= “(inv)” 
−𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝑇 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝑇 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾(𝐻 + 𝑇 + 𝐿) 
(inv, dr, x, ch) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝐻 
(inv, dr, x, dr) −𝑐𝑃 − 𝛾𝐻 
“(n, dr)” −𝛾𝐻 −𝛾𝐻 −𝛾𝐻 
 
Figure A1. Elimination of dominated strategies. 
Remember that T < H applies. The grey shaded cells identify the best strategy of P for a 
given decision by J and D. This clearly shows that the six strategies of the types (inv, ch, x, 
ch), (inv, dr, x, ch) and (inv, dr, x, dr) are never optimal for P and thus are always dominated 
by one of the other strategies: either by (inv, ch, x, dr) if the judge investigates himself or 
charges blindly, or simply by the non-investigative strategies of type (n, dr). For the purpose 
of finding Nash equilibria in pure strategies, we can eliminate dominated strategies, since 
they will never be best responses. We thus only keep the strategies (inv, ch, x, dr), which 
for the sake of brevity we label as “investigate (inv)” from here. 
Thus, the strategic form can be reduced to a 3x3x4 tri-matrix for a given plea deal Σ, 
indicating the payoffs of the players. 
A2 Reduced strategic form of the game 
For each cell, the first row describes the payoff of the judge, the second row the defendant´s 























































































































































































-γ(F+T)-(1- γ) Σ 
-γT-(1-γ) αH 
-γT-(1- γ)αH 
-γ(F+T)-(1- γ) Σ 
-γT-(1-γ) αH 
-γ(T+H)-(1- γ)αH 

















A3 Proof of Proposition 1. 
(i) If a deal is always rejected and the Judge acquits the defendant, the prosecutor´s best 
response is to save effort and drop the case in the first place. If the prosecutor drops the 
case, all choices of the judge and the defendants are best responses, given that the case never 
reaches court. (ii) For (n, ac) being a best response of the judge in the subgame where P 
charges the defendant, given the beliefs 2 , J must prefer acquittal to conviction which 
requires 
2 2 2(1 )
1
H T H T
   

       






c T H T
H
        . This belief is consistent in the tradition of KREPS and 
WILSON (1982): Given that the players ‘tremble’ in their strategies with a small probability 
 , implying that at each information set, the equilibrium strategy by the player is actually 




(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
g ch rej
  
    

  
   


















  . Consequently, (rej, rej) is optimal for the defendants due to T < Σ. ■ 
A4 Proof of Proposition 2.1. 
For P to choose (inv), investigations are preferable to a blind charge, 











      . 
Clearly, this justifies 1 1  . For the judge to choose (n,co) over the two alternatives, if his 






    







. This belief is consistent: Given that the players ‘tremble’ in 
their strategies with a small probability  , implying that at each information set, the 
equilibrium strategy by the player is actually played with probability 1  , and the other 
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strategy with probability  . This yields the belief  2
(1 )
|
(1 ) (1 )(2 ²)
g ch rej
  








(1 ) 2 (1 ) 
 




. Note that the belief also meets 
the above established two requirements if ε is positive, but sufficiently small. Given (n, co), 
the defendants will always accept the deal. ■ 
A5  Proof of Proposition 3. 















   and beliefs 1   and 2   apply. 
For P to choose (n,ch) as best response to (n, co) and (acc, acc), (i) the blind charge must be 







        and (ii) the blind charge must 
be preferable to dropping the case altogether (1 )
1
H H
   

     

. Thus, belief 
1   is justified for the judge. Given (n, ch) and (acc, acc), J is indifferent between his 
three strategies, so strategy (n, co) is as good as his other options. Given (n, ch) and (n, co), 
D always prefers to accept the plea deal. For this Nash equilibrium to be sequentially 
rational, J must prefer a ‘blind’ conviction to investigations when his information set is 






   . This belief is consistent: Given that the 
players ‘tremble’ in their strategies with a small probability  , implying that at each 
information set, the equilibrium strategy by the player is actually played with probability 




(1 ) (1 )(1 )
g ch rej
   
     

  
   





  .■ 
A6 Proof of Proposition 2.2. 
A trembling-hand perfect (TH-perfect) equilibrium requires, in addition to the SE, the 
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, i.e. each equilibrium strategy of the players 
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must be robust to minor errors by the other players (see Kreps and Wilson 1982, p. 864). 
We restrict our analysis to the reduced normal form game, given Σ and assume that each 
player expects the other player´s to choose the equilibrium strategy with probability  1   
and the remaining n non-equilibrium strategies with probability  n . The error 
probability ε is positive, but small. First, we illustrate this application with the judge who 
chooses the strategy (n, co). His expected payoff ( , )J n co  then is 
 
 
( , ) 1
3 3
(1 )(1 ) ( (1 ) (1 )( ) ( (1 )
2 3 3 3 2
J
n co T T
H T H T H T H H
    
              
      
                 
, 
which simplifies to 
2 2
( , ) (1 ) (1 )
3 2 3
J
n co T H T H
               
. For (inv), he 
expects 
2 2 2
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )(1 ) ( )
3 2 3 3
J J J
inv T c H T c H
                   
. For (n,ac), 
he then expects 
2 2 2
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3 2 3 3
J
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. 
We find that ( , ) ( )J Jn co inv   if 
2
0









 and that 
( , ) ( , )
J J








, which means that (n,co) is a TH-perfect 





inv c T H L
         . If she chooses (n,ch), she expects 
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P
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. For (n,dr), she expects 
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 , the positive 
change in the numerator exceeds the change in the denominator for a given ε, thus the 




 . For the defendant, the strategy (acc,acc) yields a payoff of  




       . For (rej,rej) the payoff gives 
1
( , ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
2 2 2
D rej rej F T T F F
                           
. Choosing (acc,rej) gives 
 ( , ) 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
2 2
D
acc rej T F
              
 
, and the strategy  (rej,acc) yields  
( , ) 1 1 (1 )
2 2 2
D rej acc T F
                        
. We find that ( , )D acc acc >
( , )
D
rej rej  as the condition 1(1 ) 1 (1 )
2 2 2 2
F T T F F
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  . Lastly, we find that ( , )D acc acc > ( , )D rej acc  as 1
2
T F
     
 
 holds for 
T>0 and small ε. Thus, (acc,acc) is also a TH-perfect strategy. Given that the beliefs are 
consistent for small ε (see proof in A4) and all equilibrium strategies are TH-perfect, this 
combination of strategies and beliefs is a TH-perfect equilibrium. 
 
 
 
